Long-term partnership for achieving efficient capacity allocation
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Publication:5129174
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Cites work
- A Dynamic Principal-Agent Model with Hidden Information: Sequential Optimality Through Truthful State Revelation
- An efficient dynamic mechanism
- Auctions with dynamic costly information acquisition
- Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
- Discounted Dynamic Programming
- Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
- Dynamic mechanism design: a Myersonian approach
- Game theory
- Horizontal coordinating contracts in the semiconductor industry
- Implications of renegotiation for optimal contract flexibility and investment
- Optimal dynamic mechanism design and the virtual-pivot mechanism
- Partnership in a dynamic production system with unobservable actions and noncontractible output
- Promised Lead-Time Contracts Under Asymmetric Information
- Technical note: Optimal long-term supply contracts with asymmetric demand information
- The dynamic pivot mechanism
- Universal possibility and impossibility results
- VCG mechanisms and efficient ex ante investments with externalities
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