Long-term partnership for achieving efficient capacity allocation
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Publication:5129174
DOI10.1287/OPRE.2019.1878zbMATH Open1455.91136OpenAlexW3123175912WikidataQ127520908 ScholiaQ127520908MaRDI QIDQ5129174FDOQ5129174
Authors:
Publication date: 26 October 2020
Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2019.1878
Recommendations
Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Mechanism design theory (91B03) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)
Cites Work
- Game theory
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- Promised Lead-Time Contracts Under Asymmetric Information
- Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
- Optimal dynamic mechanism design and the virtual-pivot mechanism
- A Dynamic Principal-Agent Model with Hidden Information: Sequential Optimality Through Truthful State Revelation
- Auctions with dynamic costly information acquisition
- VCG mechanisms and efficient ex ante investments with externalities
- Technical note: Optimal long-term supply contracts with asymmetric demand information
- Partnership in a dynamic production system with unobservable actions and noncontractible output
Cited In (1)
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