Implications of renegotiation for optimal contract flexibility and investment

DOI10.1287/MNSC.1070.0731MaRDI QIDQ3116156zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Terry A. Taylor, Erica Plambeck

Publication date 21 February 2012

Published in Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8qj2h4vj

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingrenegotiationbiform gamesflexibility contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Recommendations

• Contract, renegotiation, and holdup: results on the technology of trade and investment
• Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information
• Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
• Signalling and Renegotiation in Contractual Relationships
• Strategic effects of renegotiation-proof contracts

Cited in

(11)

• Should purchasing activities be outsourced along with production?
• The optimal investment decision for an innovative supplier in a supply chain
• The middleman as a panacea for supply chain coordination problems
• Government subsidies for green technology development under uncertainty
• Long-term partnership for achieving efficient capacity allocation
• Game-theoretic analysis of cooperation among supply chain agents: Review and extensions
• Effect of timing on reliability improvement and ordering decisions in a decentralized assembly system
• Quality collaboration contracts under product pricing strategies
• Range contracts: risk sharing and beyond
• Impact of structure, market share and information asymmetry on supply contracts for a single supplier multiple buyer network
• Coordination of channel members' efforts and utilities in contract farming operations

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