Implications of renegotiation for optimal contract flexibility and investment

DOI10.1287/MNSC.1070.0731zbMATH Open1232.91326OpenAlexW3121830607MaRDI QIDQ3116156FDOQ3116156

Terry A. Taylor, Erica Plambeck

Publication date: 21 February 2012

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8qj2h4vj

Recommendations

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zbMATH Keywords

bargainingrenegotiationbiform gamesflexibility contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cited In (11)

• Government subsidies for green technology development under uncertainty
• Effect of timing on reliability improvement and ordering decisions in a decentralized assembly system
• The optimal investment decision for an innovative supplier in a supply chain
• Quality collaboration contracts under product pricing strategies
• Coordination of channel members' efforts and utilities in contract farming operations
• The middleman as a panacea for supply chain coordination problems
• Long-Term Partnership for Achieving Efficient Capacity Allocation
• Range contracts: risk sharing and beyond
• Impact of structure, market share and information asymmetry on supply contracts for a single supplier multiple buyer network
• Game-theoretic analysis of cooperation among supply chain agents: Review and extensions
• Should purchasing activities be outsourced along with production?

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