Recommendations
- Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships
- Efficiency in partnerships
- Optimal sharing rules in repeated partnerships
- Efficient partnership formation in networks
- Efficient Sequential Bargaining
- Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms1
- Asymptotic efficiency of a seqrential allocation rule
- Efficiency in partnerships with joint monitoring
- Equilibria in sequential allocation
- Sequential Equilibria
Cites work
- An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
- Efficiency in partnerships
- Efficiency in partnerships with joint monitoring
- Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships
- Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency
- Stopping agents from ``cheating
Cited in
(14)- How to share it out: the value of information in teams
- On surplus-sharing in partnerships
- Combinatorial agency
- Joint production in teams
- Efficiency in partnerships
- Optimal incentive power for inter-team competition
- Separation of ownership and labour: Welfare considerations
- On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems
- Procrastination in teams and contract design
- Mediated partnerships
- Optimal sharing rules in repeated partnerships
- Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships
- Long-term partnership for achieving efficient capacity allocation
- Epsilon-efficiency in a dynamic partnership with adverse selection and moral hazard
This page was built for publication: Efficiency in sequential partnerships
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1289255)
