Optimal incentive power for inter-team competition

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2024.111733MaRDI QIDQ6594303zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Satoshi Matsuzawa

Publication date 28 August 2024

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ECONLET.2024.111733

zbMATH Keywords

free-rider problemsrelative performance evaluationteam production

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Labor markets (91B39)

Recommendations

• Optimal team incentives with CES production
• Incentives versus competitive balance
• Robust Incentives for Teams
• Allocation rules of indivisible prizes in team contests
• Optimal prize design in team contests with pairwise battles

Cites work

• Efficiency in partnerships
• Efficiency in partnerships with joint monitoring
• Efficiency in sequential partnerships
• Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents

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