Optimal prize design in team contests with pairwise battles
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Publication:6139984
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105765MaRDI QIDQ6139984FDOQ6139984
Authors: Xin Feng, Qian Jiao, Zhonghong Kuang, Jingfeng Lu 
Publication date: 19 January 2024
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
- Optimal prize allocation in contests: the role of negative prizes
- Multi-battle contests
- Election Goals and the Allocation of Campaign Resources
- Racing with Uncertainty
- Rent-seeking for a public good with additive contributions
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- A simple model of competition between teams
- A tug-of-war team contest
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- The dynamics of Majoritarian Blotto games
- Performance-maximizing large contests
- On the optimal allocation of prizes in best-of-three all-pay auctions
- Eternal peace in the tug-of-war?
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