Allocation rules of indivisible prizes in team contests

DOI10.1007/S00199-023-01534-9MaRDI QIDQ6590141zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Hideo Konishi, Nicolas Sahuguet, Benoît S. Y. Crutzen

Publication date 21 August 2024

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardcontestteam

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078983 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3095897 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Game theory
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• Group efforts when performance is determined by the ``best shot
• Intra-group heterogeneity in collective contests
• Introduction to the special issue on contests
• Optimal prize allocations in group contests
• Private-information group contests: best-shot competition
• Rank effects in bargaining: evidence from government formation
• Strategic choice of sharing rules in collective contests
• Strategy and dynamics in contests
• The theory of contests: a survey
• Winner's effort maximization in large contests

Cited in

(2)

• Optimal incentive power for inter-team competition
• Optimal prize design in team contests with pairwise battles

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