Allocation rules of indivisible prizes in team contests

DOI10.1007/S00199-023-01534-9zbMATH Open1542.9111MaRDI QIDQ6590141FDOQ6590141

Authors: Hideo Konishi, Nicolas Sahuguet, Benoît S. Y. Crutzen 

Publication date: 21 August 2024

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardcontestteam

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

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• Game theory
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• Group efforts when performance is determined by the ``best shot
• Rank effects in bargaining: evidence from government formation
• Private-information group contests: best-shot competition
• A simple model of competition between teams
• Optimal prize allocations in group contests
• Effort complementarity and sharing rules in group contests
• Winner's effort maximization in large contests
• Group contests with private information and the ``weakest link
• Introduction to the special issue on contests

Cited In (2)

• Optimal prize design in team contests with pairwise battles
• Optimal incentive power for inter-team competition

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