Rent-seeking for a public good with additive contributions

DOI10.1007/s00355-013-0741-3zbMath1291.91147OpenAlexW2045504429MaRDI QIDQ2247960

Iryna Topolyan

Publication date: 30 June 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0741-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (11)

Best-shot versus weakest-link in political lobbying: an application of group all-pay auction ⋮ A ``fractal solution to the chopstick auction ⋮ Contests between two groups for a group-specific public-good/bad prize ⋮ Optimal prize design in team contests with pairwise battles ⋮ The best-shot all-pay (group) auction with complete information ⋮ Non-deterministic group contest with private information ⋮ Contests with multiple alternative prizes: public-good/bad prizes and externalities ⋮ A simple model of competition between teams ⋮ Group contests with private information and the ``weakest link ⋮ Risk preference heterogeneity in group contests ⋮ Sharing the effort costs in group contests

Cites Work

• The alliance formation puzzle and capacity constraints
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Contests with group-specific public-good prizes
• Strong decomposition of random variables
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