Information about sellers' past behavior in the market for lemons

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2017.02.012zbMATH Open1400.91223OpenAlexW2593839613MaRDI QIDQ2397640FDOQ2397640

Authors: Kyung Min Kim 

Publication date: 23 May 2017

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.012

Recommendations

• Trading dynamics with private buyer signals in the market for lemons
• Competitive search markets for durable goods
• Time-on-the-Market as a Sign of Quality
• Waiting for news in the market for lemons
• Imperfect information transmission and adverse selection in asset markets

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionsequential searchtime-on-the-market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Trading Dynamics with Adverse Selection and Search: Market Freeze, Intervention and Recovery
• Waiting for news in the market for lemons
• Education Signalling with Preemptive Offers
• Bargaining with common values
• Bargaining with Interdependent Values
• Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons
• Trading dynamics in decentralized markets with adverse selection
• Time-on-the-Market as a Sign of Quality
• Dynamic markets for lemons: Performance, liquidity, and policy intervention
• Sequential Bargaining with Correlated Values
• Transparency and price formation
• The coalitional Nash bargaining solution
• Signalling in a Dynamic Labour Market
• Transparency and distressed sales under asymmetric information
• Search With Adverse Selection
• Public offers in the market for lemons with large discounting
• Dynamic Auctions

Cited In (12)

• Government interventions in a dynamic market with adverse selection
• SELLING A LEMON UNDER DEMAND UNCERTAINTY
• Dynamic trading with developing adverse selection
• Seller experimentation and trade
• DIRECTED SEARCH WITH PHANTOM VACANCIES
• Lemons and peaches: multi-stage buying mechanisms with a Devil's Menu
• Signaling in dynamic markets with adverse selection
• Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons
• Transparency of outside options in bargaining
• Noisy signaling in discrete time
• Market screening with limited records
• Market-making with search and information frictions

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