Information about sellers' past behavior in the market for lemons

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.012zbMath1400.91223OpenAlexW2593839613MaRDI QIDQ2397640

Kyung Min Kim

Publication date: 23 May 2017

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.012

zbMATH Keywords

sequential searchadverse selectiontime-on-the-market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (11)

Lemons and peaches: multi-stage buying mechanisms with a Devil's Menu ⋮ Market-making with search and information frictions ⋮ DIRECTED SEARCH WITH PHANTOM VACANCIES ⋮ Signaling in dynamic markets with adverse selection ⋮ Government interventions in a dynamic market with adverse selection ⋮ Seller experimentation and trade ⋮ Noisy signaling in discrete time ⋮ Transparency of outside options in bargaining ⋮ Dynamic trading with developing adverse selection ⋮ SELLING A LEMON UNDER DEMAND UNCERTAINTY ⋮ Market screening with limited records

Cites Work

• Trading dynamics in decentralized markets with adverse selection
• Public offers in the market for lemons with large discounting
• Bargaining with common values
• Waiting for News in the Market for Lemons
• The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution
• Bargaining with Interdependent Values
• Signalling in a Dynamic Labour Market
• Dynamic Auctions
• Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons
• Time-on-the-Market as a Sign of Quality
• Transparency and price formation
• Dynamic markets for lemons: Performance, liquidity, and policy intervention
• Transparency and distressed sales under asymmetric information
• Trading Dynamics with Adverse Selection and Search: Market Freeze, Intervention and Recovery
• Search With Adverse Selection
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Sequential Bargaining with Correlated Values
• Education Signalling with Preemptive Offers

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