Sorting versus screening in decentralized markets with adverse selection

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105883zbMATH Open1544.91209MaRDI QIDQ6604772FDOQ6604772

Authors Sarah Auster, Piero Gottardi

Publication date 13 September 2024

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionmarket segmentationcompetitive search

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Recommendations

• Equilibrium in a decentralized market with adverse selection
• Signaling in dynamic markets with adverse selection
• Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms
• Matching markets with adverse selection
• Competing mechanisms in markets for lemons

Cites work

• A Walrasian Theory of Markets with Adverse Selection
• Adverse selection and liquidity distortion
• Adverse selection in competitive search equilibrium
• Competing mechanisms in markets for lemons
• Competitive search markets for durable goods
• Constrained efficiency with adverse selection and directed search
• Equilibrium Price Dispersion
• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
• Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets
• Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms

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