Sorting versus screening in decentralized markets with adverse selection

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105883zbMATH Open1544.91209MaRDI QIDQ6604772FDOQ6604772

Authors: Sarah Auster, Piero Gottardi 

Publication date: 13 September 2024

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Recommendations

• Equilibrium in a decentralized market with adverse selection
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• Matching markets with adverse selection
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zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionmarket segmentationcompetitive search

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

• Equilibrium Price Dispersion
• Adverse selection in competitive search equilibrium
• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
• Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms
• A Walrasian Theory of Markets with Adverse Selection
• Constrained efficiency with adverse selection and directed search
• Competitive search markets for durable goods
• Adverse selection and liquidity distortion
• Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets
• Competing mechanisms in markets for lemons

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