Recommendations
Cited in
(17)- Maximizing the minimum load for selfish agents
- Path auctions with multiple edge ownership
- Convergence of VCG mechanism to ex-post budget balance in a model of land acquisition
- Setting lower bounds on truthfulness
- Strategic pricing in next-hop routing with elastic demands
- Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification
- First-passage percolation on a ladder graph, and the path cost in a VCG auction
- Efficient money burning in general domains
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1962848 (Why is no real title available?)
- False-name-proof mechanisms for path auctions in social networks
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2119764 (Why is no real title available?)
- Efficient money burning in general domains
- Using Nash Implementation to Achieve Better Frugality Ratios
- Frugal Routing on Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks
- Frugality in path auctions
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7650127 (Why is no real title available?)
- Successive minimum spanning trees
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