Maximizing social welfare in congestion games via redistribution
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Publication:495653
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.06.010zbMath1347.91159OpenAlexW834199794MaRDI QIDQ495653
Richard Steinberg, Victor Naroditskiy
Publication date: 15 September 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/62771/
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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