Incentive compatible market design with applications
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Publication:495753
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3650233 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4207454 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3670138 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
- A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
- A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
- Bayesian and weakly robust first best mechanisms: Characterizations
- Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
- Dissolving multi-partnerships efficiently
- Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
- Ex post implementation
- House allocation with transfers
- Incentives in Teams
- Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus
- Mechanism design without revenue equivalence
- Monotonicity and implementability
- On cores and indivisibility
- On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality
- On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies
- On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions
- Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
- Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.
- Robust Mechanism Design
- Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
- The English auction with differentiated commodities
- The Limits of ex post Implementation
- Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
- Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
Cited in
(19)- Market Design
- Balanced implementability of sequencing rules
- On incentive compatibility in dynamic mechanism design with exit option in a Markovian environment
- Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
- Countervailing incentives in allocation mechanisms with type-dependent externalities
- Mechanism design for pandemics
- Balanced ranking mechanisms
- Multilateral deferred-acceptance mechanisms
- The deficit on each trade in a Vickrey double auction is at least as large as the Walrasian price gap
- Incentive compatibility and feasibility constraints in housing markets
- Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values
- Worst-case efficient and budget-balanced mechanism for single-object allocation with interdependent values
- Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade
- On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching
- The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching
- Incentive-compatible simple mechanisms
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- Pricing in position auctions and online advertising
- The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
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