Incentive compatible market design with applications

DOI10.1007/S00182-014-0444-8zbMATH Open1388.91114OpenAlexW2026240790MaRDI QIDQ495753FDOQ495753

M. Bumin Yenmez

Publication date: 15 September 2015

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0444-8

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zbMATH Keywords

matchingincomplete informationauctionsincentive compatibilitymultidimensional types

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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Cited In (12)

• Market Design
• Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values
• Pricing in position auctions and online advertising
• Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade
• On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching
• On incentive compatibility in dynamic mechanism design with exit option in a Markovian environment
• Balanced ranking mechanisms
• Balanced implementability of sequencing rules
• Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
• The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching
• Worst-case efficient and budget-balanced mechanism for single-object allocation with interdependent values
• The deficit on each trade in a Vickrey double auction is at least as large as the Walrasian price gap

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