Pricing in position auctions and online advertising

DOI10.1007/S00199-013-0748-0MaRDI QIDQ2636854zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors M. Bumin Yenmez

Publication date 18 February 2014

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0748-0

zbMATH Keywords

ex post payoff equivalencemultidimensional typesonline advertisingposition auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Marketing, advertising (90B60) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Review text

The paper studies whether online search engines can increase revenues by changing the commonly used auction format of second-price auction. The author proves that, if the pricing functions are regular, then there is an ex post equilibrium of the ascending auction that is ex post payoff equivalent to the celebrated VCG mechanism.

Recommendations

• Bidding to the Top: VCG and Equilibria of Position-Based Auctions
• Position Auctions with Consumer Search
• Two pricing mechanisms in sponsored search advertising
• Optimal dynamic pricing for sponsored search advertising
• On Revenue Maximization in Second-Price Ad Auctions

Cites work

• A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints
• Ascending auctions for multiple objects: the case for the Japanese design
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Incentive compatible market design with applications
• Microeconomic theory
• Optimal Auction Design
• Sequential equilibria of asymmetric ascending auctions: The case of log-normal distributions
• Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints
• Vickrey auctions with reserve pricing

Cited in

(18)

• Generalized second price auctions over a network
• Hybrid mechanisms for Vickrey-Clarke-Groves and generalized second-price bids
• Optimal dynamic pricing for sponsored search advertising
• Position auctions with multi-unit demands
• Fairness and efficiency in online advertising mechanisms
• Two pricing mechanisms in sponsored search advertising
• Theoretical game analysis of position auctions according to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism with two-stage ranking
• Position auctions with externalities
• Online Auction and List Price Revenue Management
• Position Auctions with Consumer Search
• Sponsored search auctions
• Pricing game of online display advertisement publishers
• Keyword auctions with budget-constrained bidders
• Ad auctions with data
• Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions
• Revenue-maximizing rankings for online platforms with quality-sensitive consumers
• Bidding on Configurations in Internet Ad Auctions
• A two-stage revenue pricing model for internet advertising with the risk-aversion

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