Pricing in position auctions and online advertising

DOI10.1007/s00199-013-0748-0zbMath1283.91082OpenAlexW3122330734MaRDI QIDQ2636854

M. Bumin Yenmez

Publication date: 18 February 2014

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0748-0

zbMATH Keywords

multidimensional typesonline advertisingposition auctionsex post payoff equivalence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Marketing, advertising (90B60)

Related Items (4)

Generalized second price auctions over a network ⋮ Keyword auctions with budget-constrained bidders ⋮ Hybrid mechanisms for Vickrey-Clarke-Groves and generalized second-price bids ⋮ Position auctions with multi-unit demands

Cites Work

• Incentive compatible market design with applications
• A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints
• Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints
• Sequential equilibria of asymmetric ascending auctions: The case of log-normal distributions
• Vickrey auctions with reserve pricing
• Ascending auctions for multiple objects: the case for the Japanese design
• Optimal Auction Design
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Unnamed Item

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