A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.001zbMath1279.91081OpenAlexW2078470564MaRDI QIDQ765229

R. Ravi, Isa E. Hafalir, Amin Sayedi

Publication date: 19 March 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.001

zbMATH Keywords

Vickrey auctionsbudget constraints

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (12)

Auctions vs. fixed pricing: competing for budget constrained buyers ⋮ Pricing in position auctions and online advertising ⋮ Overbidding and inefficiencies in multi-unit Vickrey auctions for normal goods ⋮ Polyhedral Clinching Auctions for Two-Sided Markets ⋮ Endogenous budget constraints in auctions ⋮ Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer ⋮ Keyword auctions with budget-constrained bidders ⋮ Sequential second-price auctions with private budgets ⋮ An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders ⋮ Optimal and efficient mechanisms with asymmetrically budget constrained buyers ⋮ Polyhedral Clinching Auctions and the AdWords Polytope ⋮ Mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with budget constraints

Cites Work

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• Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
• Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget constrained bidders
• Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
• Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders
• Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness
• Revenue maximization when bidders have budgets
• Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
• A Truthful Mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Scheduling

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