A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.08.001MaRDI QIDQ765229zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Isa E. Hafalir, R. Ravi, Amin Sayedi

Publication date 19 March 2012

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.001

zbMATH Keywords

Vickrey auctionsbudget constraints

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6297730 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Truthful Mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Scheduling
• Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
• Multiple-object auctions with budget constrained bidders
• Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
• Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget constrained bidders
• Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness
• Revenue maximization when bidders have budgets
• Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders

Cited in

(25)

• Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
• Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents
• Optimal private good allocation: the case for a balanced budget
• Optimal and efficient mechanisms with asymmetrically budget constrained buyers
• Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness
• Pricing in position auctions and online advertising
• Budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items
• Polyhedral clinching auctions for two-sided markets
• Auctions vs. fixed pricing: competing for budget constrained buyers
• Mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with budget constraints
• Overbidding and inefficiencies in multi-unit Vickrey auctions for normal goods
• Endogenous budget constraints in auctions
• An efficient and incentive-compatible dynamic multi-item auction under budget constraints
• Pareto optimal budgeted combinatorial auctions
• Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer
• Keyword auctions with budget-constrained bidders
• Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget constrained bidders
• Non-obvious manipulability in package assignment problems with money
• Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets
• Approximately Efficient Double Auctions with Strong Budget Balance
• An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders
• Sequential second-price auctions with private budgets
• Quantifying the inefficiency of multi-unit auctions for normal goods
• Mechanism design for auctions with externalities on budgets
• First‐price auctions with budget constraints

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