A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.08.001zbMATH Open1279.91081OpenAlexW2078470564MaRDI QIDQ765229FDOQ765229

R. Ravi, Isa E. Hafalir, Amin Sayedi

Publication date: 19 March 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.001

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zbMATH Keywords

Vickrey auctionsbudget constraints

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
• Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
• Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
• Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness
• Multiple-object auctions with budget constrained bidders
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A Truthful Mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Scheduling
• Revenue maximization when bidders have budgets
• Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget constrained bidders

Cited In (18)

• Polyhedral clinching auctions and the AdWords polytope
• Optimal and efficient mechanisms with asymmetrically budget constrained buyers
• Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness
• Pricing in position auctions and online advertising
• Budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items
• Auctions vs. fixed pricing: competing for budget constrained buyers
• Mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with budget constraints
• Overbidding and inefficiencies in multi-unit Vickrey auctions for normal goods
• Endogenous budget constraints in auctions
• Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer
• Keyword auctions with budget-constrained bidders
• Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets
• Approximately Efficient Double Auctions with Strong Budget Balance
• Sequential second-price auctions with private budgets
• An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders
• Polyhedral Clinching Auctions for Two-Sided Markets
• First‐price auctions with budget constraints
• Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers

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