Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
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Publication:1350873
DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(96)00849-XzbMath0875.90278MaRDI QIDQ1350873
Jacques Robert, Jean-Jacques Laffont
Publication date: 27 February 1997
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(96)00849-x
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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