Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
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Publication:1350873
DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(96)00849-XzbMATH Open0875.90278OpenAlexW2002095701MaRDI QIDQ1350873FDOQ1350873
Authors: Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jacques Robert 
Publication date: 27 February 1997
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(96)00849-x
Cites Work
Cited In (41)
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