Endogenous budget constraints in auctions
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Publication:896934
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.03.010zbMath1330.91091OpenAlexW1991710782MaRDI QIDQ896934
Publication date: 15 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.03.010
Related Items
Auctions vs. fixed pricing: competing for budget constrained buyers ⋮ Optimal auctions with endogenous budgets ⋮ Endogenous budget constraints ⋮ Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents ⋮ Rejection prices and an auctioneer with non-monotonic utility ⋮ Post-auction investment by financially constrained bidders ⋮ Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences ⋮ The dynamics of bidding markets with financial constraints ⋮ A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit auctions ⋮ Wars of attrition with endogenously determined budget constraints
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