Endogenous budget constraints in auctions

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.03.010MaRDI QIDQ896934zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Justin Burkett

Publication date 15 December 2015

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.03.010

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsbudget constraints

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Optimally constraining a bidder using a simple budget
• Optimal auctions with endogenous budgets
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• Multiple-object auctions with budget constrained bidders
• Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information

Cites work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints
• Classes of orderings of measures and related correlation inequalities. I. Multivariate totally positive distributions
• Credit contracting and bidding under wealth constraints.
• Equilibrium of affiliated value second price auctions with financially constrained bidders: The two-bidder case
• Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
• High bids and broke winners
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• Multiple-object auctions with budget constrained bidders
• On the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders.
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
• Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget constrained bidders
• Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
• Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
• Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
• The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer

Cited in

(15)

• Rejection prices and an auctioneer with non-monotonic utility
• Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents
• Wars of attrition with endogenously determined budget constraints
• Endogenous entry in auctions with negative externalities
• The dynamics of bidding markets with financial constraints
• Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences
• Auctions vs. fixed pricing: competing for budget constrained buyers
• Auctions with endogenous entry
• Optimally constraining a bidder using a simple budget
• A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit auctions
• Optimal auctions with endogenous budgets
• Selling to a manager and a budget-constrained agent
• Post-auction investment by financially constrained bidders
• Endogenous budget constraints
• On the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders.

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