Optimal auctions with endogenous budgets

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2016.02.017zbMath1396.91228OpenAlexW2290756805MaRDI QIDQ1668196

Brian Baisa, Stanislav Rabinovich

Publication date: 3 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.02.017

zbMATH Keywords

liquidityall-pay auctionbudget constraintsoptimal auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Post-auction investment by financially constrained bidders

Cites Work

• Endogenous budget constraints in auctions
• Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
• Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
• On the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders.
• The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer
• Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
• On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints
• Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical
• Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
• Optimal Auction Design
• Money in Search Equilibrium, in Competitive Equilibrium, and in Competitive Search Equilibrium

This page was built for publication: Optimal auctions with endogenous budgets