Post-auction investment by financially constrained bidders

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2023.105742zbMath1530.91227OpenAlexW4386976890MaRDI QIDQ6090466

Ryuji Sano

Publication date: 17 November 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105742

zbMATH Keywords

investmentauctionfinancial constraintscoring auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Endogenous budget constraints in auctions
• Multidimensional auctions
• Vickrey allocation rule with income effect
• Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations
• Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
• Optimal auctions with endogenous budgets
• Efficient investments in the implementation problem
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View
• Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
• Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
• Isotone Equilibrium in Games of Incomplete Information

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