Post-auction investment by financially constrained bidders

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105742MaRDI QIDQ6090466zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ryuji Sano

Publication date 17 November 2023

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105742

zbMATH Keywords

auctionfinancial constraintinvestmentscoring auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
• Investment decisions under first and second price auctions
• Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
• Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions
• On the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders.

Cites work

• Allocative and informational externalities in auctions and related mechanisms
• Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View
• Efficient investments in the implementation problem
• Endogenous budget constraints in auctions
• Isotone Equilibrium in Games of Incomplete Information
• Multidimensional auctions
• Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
• Optimal auctions with endogenous budgets
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations
• Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
• Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
• Vickrey allocation rule with income effect

Cited in

(1)

• Equity auctions with bidder moral hazard

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