Post-auction investment by financially constrained bidders
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Publication:6090466
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2023.105742zbMath1530.91227OpenAlexW4386976890MaRDI QIDQ6090466
Publication date: 17 November 2023
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105742
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- Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
- Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
- Isotone Equilibrium in Games of Incomplete Information
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