Efficient investments in the implementation problem
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Publication:2419597
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2019.04.009zbMath1410.91212OpenAlexW2942750643MaRDI QIDQ2419597
Publication date: 14 June 2019
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10453/133089
mechanism designinvestment efficiencyfull implementation\textit{ex ante} investment\textit{ex post} investment
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Post-auction investment by financially constrained bidders, Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments
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