First‐price auctions with budget constraints
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Publication:3299508
DOI10.3982/TE2982zbMATH Open1445.91022OpenAlexW2965955041MaRDI QIDQ3299508FDOQ3299508
Authors: Maciej H. Kotowski 
Publication date: 23 July 2020
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te2982
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- Budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items
- First-price auctions with unobservable entry
- Simultaneous auctions with budgets: equilibrium existence and characterization
- A tighter welfare guarantee for first-price auctions
- Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction
- Procuring substitutes with (fine-tuned) first-price auctions
- All-pay vs. standard auctions when competing for budget-constrained buyers
- Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer
- Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information
- High bids and broke winners
- Optimal dynamic multi-keyword bidding policy of an advertiser in search-based advertising
- Budget constraints in homogenous multi-unit auctions
- Framing the first-price auction
- Rejection prices and an auctioneer with non-monotonic utility
- Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents
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