First‐price auctions with budget constraints

DOI10.3982/TE2982MaRDI QIDQ3299508zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Maciej H. Kotowski

Publication date 23 July 2020

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te2982

zbMATH Keywords

interdependent valuesfirst-price auctionbudget constraints

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(20)

• Rejection prices and an auctioneer with non-monotonic utility
• Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents
• Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
• Non-existence of equilibria in simultaneous auctions with a common budget-constraint
• Budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items
• First-price auctions with unobservable entry
• Mind the revenue gap: on the performance of approximation mechanisms under budget constraints
• Simultaneous auctions with budgets: equilibrium existence and characterization
• A tighter welfare guarantee for first-price auctions
• Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction
• Endogenous budget constraints in auctions
• On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints
• Procuring substitutes with (fine-tuned) first-price auctions
• Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer
• All-pay vs. standard auctions when competing for budget-constrained buyers
• Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information
• Optimal dynamic multi-keyword bidding policy of an advertiser in search-based advertising
• High bids and broke winners
• Budget constraints in homogenous multi-unit auctions
• Framing the first-price auction

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