Simple combinatorial auctions with budget constraints
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Publication:2006772
DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2020.07.019zbMath1459.91067arXiv2007.14274OpenAlexW3044780425MaRDI QIDQ2006772
Publication date: 12 October 2020
Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.14274
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Cites Work
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