Walrasian pricing in multi-unit auctions
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Publication:6136100
DOI10.1016/j.artint.2023.103961MaRDI QIDQ6136100
Simina Brânzei, Yulong Zeng, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Peter Bro Miltersen
Publication date: 28 August 2023
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2017/8119/
Cites Work
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