Revenue maximization when bidders have budgets

DOI10.1145/1109557.1109676zbMath1192.91094OpenAlexW4238808599MaRDI QIDQ3583424

Zoë Abrams

Publication date: 16 August 2010

Published in: Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm - SODA '06 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/1109557.1109676

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (10)

A simple mechanism for a budget-constrained buyer ⋮ Walrasian pricing in multi-unit auctions ⋮ The balloon popping problem revisited: lower and upper bounds ⋮ Online random sampling for budgeted settings ⋮ Unconditional competitive auctions with copy and budget constraints ⋮ Competitive auctions ⋮ On envy-free revenue approximation for combinatorial buyers with budgets ⋮ Polyhedral Clinching Auctions and the AdWords Polytope ⋮ Multi-unit auctions with budget limits ⋮ A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints

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