Online random sampling for budgeted settings

DOI10.1007/s00224-019-09918-yzbMath1422.91301OpenAlexW2933377589MaRDI QIDQ5919606

Michal Feldman, Alon Eden, Adi Vardi

Publication date: 5 September 2019

Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-019-09918-y

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designrevenue maximizationbudgetsliquid welfareonline multi-unit auctionsonline mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Simple combinatorial auctions with budget constraints

Cites Work

• Liquid price of anarchy
• Liquid welfare maximization in auctions with multiple items
• Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
• Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions
• The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design
• Competitive auctions
• Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
• Reducing truth-telling online mechanisms to online optimization
• Revenue maximization when bidders have budgets
• The Efficiency of Resource Allocation Mechanisms for Budget-Constrained Users
• A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer
• Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets
• Clinching Auctions with Online Supply
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