Near-optimal online auctions

zbMATH Open1297.91075MaRDI QIDQ2921789FDOQ2921789

Authors: Jason D. Hartline, Avrim Blum 

Publication date: 13 October 2014

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cited In (33)

• Reducing mechanism design to algorithm design via machine learning
• Deals or no deals: contract design for online advertising
• Competitive algorithms for unbounded one-way trading
• Online learning in online auctions
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Optimal Real-Time Bidding Strategies
• Derandomization of auctions
• Oracle-efficient Online Learning and Auction Design
• Estimating intermediate price transitions in online auctions
• Optimal sale across venues and auctions with a buy-now option
• Oblivious Medians Via Online Bidding
• Small-Loss Bounds for Online Learning with Partial Information
• Prior-free multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders
• New bounds for the balloon popping problem
• Competitive auctions
• Clairvoyant mechanisms for online auctions
• Aggregating Strategy for Online Auctions
• Multi-scale online learning: theory and applications to online auctions and pricing
• Online pricing for bundles of multiple items
• Simple pricing schemes for consumers with evolving values
• The balloon popping problem revisited: lower and upper bounds
• Optimal starting price for eBay-like online auctions
• A speedy auction using approximated bidders' preferences
• Frequency capping in online advertising
• Constant competitive algorithms for unbounded one-way trading under monotone hazard rate
• The balloon popping problem revisited: lower and upper bounds
• An \(\alpha \)-regret analysis of adversarial bilateral trade
• Equilibria in online games
• A multiple-choice secretary algorithm with applications to online auctions
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Online random sampling for budgeted settings
• Sequential posted price mechanisms with correlated valuations
• Mathematics of the Internet. E-auction and markets. Proceedings of a workshop, Minneapolis, MN, USA, December 2000

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