Clairvoyant mechanisms for online auctions

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-42634-1_1zbMATH Open1479.91144OpenAlexW2489297279MaRDI QIDQ2817844FDOQ2817844

Authors: Philipp Brandes, Zengfeng Huang, Hsin-Hao Su, Roger Wattenhofer 

Publication date: 2 September 2016

Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42634-1_1

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2119761

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Algorithmic Game Theory
• Incentives in Teams
• An Incremental Model for Combinatorial Maximization Problems
• The Online Median Problem
• Incremental medians via online bidding
• Dynamic Programming and Decision Theory
• Performance guarantees for hierarchical clustering
• Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions
• Online knapsack problem with removal cost
• Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items
• Buyback problem -- approximate matroid intersection with cancellation costs
• Approximation algorithms for hierarchical location problems
• Unit cost buyback problem
• Incremental flow
• Online scheduling of unit length jobs with commitment and penalties

Cited In (1)

• Bidding agents for online auctions with hidden bids

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