Revenue Maximizing Envy-Free Fixed-Price Auctions with Budgets

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_18zbMath1406.91166OpenAlexW98084034MaRDI QIDQ2936988

Piotr Sankowski, Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Qiang Zhang, Stefano Leonardi

Publication date: 7 January 2015

Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11573/754515

zbMATH Keywords

revenue maximizationenvy-free item-pricing allocations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Software, source code, etc. for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-04)

Related Items (8)

Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents ⋮ Walrasian pricing in multi-unit auctions ⋮ Revenue Maximizing Envy-Free Pricing in Matching Markets with Budgets ⋮ On envy-free revenue approximation for combinatorial buyers with budgets ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ On fair price discrimination in multi-unit markets ⋮ Envy-Free Revenue Approximation for Asymmetric Buyers with Budgets ⋮ On social envy-freeness in multi-unit markets

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