On the efficiency of the proportional allocation mechanism for divisible resources
DOI10.1007/S00224-016-9701-5zbMATH Open1356.91063OpenAlexW996368221WikidataQ59473987 ScholiaQ59473987MaRDI QIDQ506522FDOQ506522
Authors: George Christodoulou, Alkmini Sgouritsa, Bo Tang 
Publication date: 1 February 2017
Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-016-9701-5
Recommendations
- On the Efficiency of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism for Divisible Resources
- Welfare guarantees for proportional allocations
- Welfare guarantees for proportional allocations
- The price of anarchy of the proportional allocation mechanism revisited
- The price of anarchy and the design of scalable resource allocation mechanisms
Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Cites Work
- Worst-case equilibria
- How bad is selfish routing?
- The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
- Designing network protocols for good equilibria
- Efficiency of scalar-parameterized mechanisms
- Subadditive functions
- Composable and efficient mechanisms
- Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions
- Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game
- Automata, Languages and Programming
- Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets
- The Price of Anarchy of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism Revisited
- Welfare Guarantees for Proportional Allocations
- Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders
- On the Efficiency of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism for Divisible Resources
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient
Cited In (15)
- The equal share proportional solution in a permit sharing problem
- Simple combinatorial auctions with budget constraints
- Automata, Languages and Programming
- A characterization of the proportional rule in multi-issue allocation situations
- Incentive ratios of a proportional sharing mechanism in resource sharing
- Asymptotic efficiency of the proportional compensation scheme for a large number of producers
- A divisor apportionment method based on the Kolm-Atkinson social welfare function and generalized entropy
- Agent incentives of a proportional sharing mechanism in resource sharing
- The Efficiency of Resource Allocation Mechanisms for Budget-Constrained Users
- An efficient Nash-implementation mechanism for network resource allocation
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- On the Efficiency of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism for Divisible Resources
- A linear proportional effort allocation rule
- Maximin share based mechanisms for multi-resource fair allocation with divisible and indivisible tasks
- A note on the efficiency of position mechanisms with budget constraints
This page was built for publication: On the efficiency of the proportional allocation mechanism for divisible resources
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q506522)
