A linear proportional effort allocation rule

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.07.002zbMath1190.91020OpenAlexW1984730698MaRDI QIDQ1038269

Yoshio Kamijo

Publication date: 17 November 2009

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.07.002

zbMATH Keywords

axiomatizationMyerson valuenetwork gamesposition valuelinear proportional effort allocation rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Related Items (3)

A solution concept for network games: the role of multilateral interactions ⋮ Power surplus solutions for weighted hypergraph communication situations ⋮ The class of ASN-position values. Centrality and consequences of connection failure

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• A strategic model of social and economic networks
• A characterization of the position value
• On the Position Value for Communication Situations
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• WEIGHTED MYERSON VALUE

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