The selectope for cooperative games
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Publication:1972258
DOI10.1007/S001820050003zbMATH Open0959.91004DBLPjournals/ijgt/DerksHP00OpenAlexW2057122735WikidataQ59868844 ScholiaQ59868844MaRDI QIDQ1972258FDOQ1972258
Authors: Jean Derks, Hans Haller, Hans Peters 
Publication date: 26 April 2001
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050003
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Cited In (41)
- Extreme points of two digraph polytopes: Description and applications in economics and game theory
- Preserving coalitional rationality for non-balanced games
- Cooperative game as non-additive measure
- On the Harsanyi payoff vectors and Harsanyi imputations
- The selectope for bicooperative games
- Values of games over Boolean player sets
- Coalition-weighted Shapley values
- Fuzzy Harsanyi solutions for fuzzy level structure games with multi weight systems
- Harsanyi power solution for games with restricted cooperation
- Weighted component fairness for forest games
- Games with a local permission structure: separation of authority and value generation
- Value dividends, the Harsanyi set and extensions, and the proportional Harsanyi solution
- Remarkable polyhedra related to set functions, games and capacities
- Comments on: ``Remarkable polyhedra related to set functions, games and capacities
- Concepts for decision making under severe uncertainty with partial ordinal and partial cardinal preferences
- WEBER POLYHEDRON AND WEIGHTED SHAPLEY VALUES
- On the set of imputations induced by the \(k\)-additive core
- The probabilistic Harsanyi power solutions for probabilistic graph games
- Harsanyi power solutions for games on union stable systems
- Characterizations of the random order values by Harsanyi payoff vectors
- Parallel axiomatizations of weighted and multiweighted Shapley values, random order values, and the Harsanyi set
- Fuzzy Harsanyi solution for a kind of fuzzy coalition games
- \(k\)-additive upper approximation of TU-games
- ``Procedural values for cooperative games
- A linear proportional effort allocation rule
- Constrained core solutions for totally positive games with ordered players
- Political power on a line graph
- The allowable value for cooperative games with restricted permutations
- The vector lattice structure of the \(n\)-person TU games
- The intermediate set and limiting superdifferential for coalitional games: between the core and the Weber set
- Values for level structures with polynomial-time algorithms, relevant coalition functions, and general considerations
- Extreme points of the Harsanyi set and the Weber set
- On Harsanyi dividends and asymmetric values
- On merge properties of the Shapley value
- Minimal large sets for cooperative games
- Harsanyi power solutions for graph-restricted games
- Revenue sharing of green agricultural structural coalition based on Selectope
- The selectope for games with partial cooperation
- The grand surplus value and repeated cooperative cross-games with coalitional collaboration
- The priority value for cooperative games with a priority structure
- Harsanyi support levels solutions
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