The selectope for cooperative games

DOI10.1007/S001820050003MaRDI QIDQ1972258zbMATH OpenOpenAlexDBLPWikidataFDO

Authors Jean Derks, Hans Haller, Hans Peters

Publication date 26 April 2001

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050003

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gameWeber setselectope core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44)

Recommendations

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 969999
• On three Shapley-like solutions for cooperative games with random payoffs
• The selectope for games with partial cooperation
• Values and potential of games with cooperation structure
• Maximizing selections from the core of a cooperative game
• Random order coalition structure values
• Hierarchical organization structures and constraints on coalition formation
• Bargaining with commitments
• Forming coalitions and the Shapley NTU value
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1599890

Cited in

(41)

• The grand surplus value and repeated cooperative cross-games with coalitional collaboration
• On the set of imputations induced by the \(k\)-additive core
• Harsanyi power solution for games with restricted cooperation
• Extreme points of two digraph polytopes: Description and applications in economics and game theory
• Extreme points of the Harsanyi set and the Weber set
• Harsanyi power solutions for graph-restricted games
• Fuzzy Harsanyi solution for a kind of fuzzy coalition games
• The probabilistic Harsanyi power solutions for probabilistic graph games
• Revenue sharing of green agricultural structural coalition based on Selectope
• \(k\)-additive upper approximation of TU-games
• On Harsanyi dividends and asymmetric values
• ``Procedural values for cooperative games
• Coalition-weighted Shapley values
• Fuzzy Harsanyi solutions for fuzzy level structure games with multi weight systems
• Preserving coalitional rationality for non-balanced games
• On the Harsanyi payoff vectors and Harsanyi imputations
• The selectope for bicooperative games
• Weighted component fairness for forest games
• Values of games over Boolean player sets
• Value dividends, the Harsanyi set and extensions, and the proportional Harsanyi solution
• The priority value for cooperative games with a priority structure
• Characterizations of the random order values by Harsanyi payoff vectors
• Harsanyi power solutions for games on union stable systems
• The intermediate set and limiting superdifferential for coalitional games: between the core and the Weber set
• On merge properties of the Shapley value
• A linear proportional effort allocation rule
• Harsanyi support levels solutions
• Remarkable polyhedra related to set functions, games and capacities
• Constrained core solutions for totally positive games with ordered players
• Political power on a line graph
• The allowable value for cooperative games with restricted permutations
• Games with a local permission structure: separation of authority and value generation
• Values for level structures with polynomial-time algorithms, relevant coalition functions, and general considerations
• Parallel axiomatizations of weighted and multiweighted Shapley values, random order values, and the Harsanyi set
• Comments on: ``Remarkable polyhedra related to set functions, games and capacities
• Cooperative game as non-additive measure
• WEBER POLYHEDRON AND WEIGHTED SHAPLEY VALUES
• The selectope for games with partial cooperation
• Concepts for decision making under severe uncertainty with partial ordinal and partial cardinal preferences
• The vector lattice structure of the \(n\)-person TU games
• Minimal large sets for cooperative games

This page was built for publication: The selectope for cooperative games

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1972258)