The selectope for games with partial cooperation
The paper studies two related solution concepts (the selectope and the Weber set), both defined as the convex hull of a set of imputations, in the context of cooperative games where not all coalitions are allowed to form. The relation of these concepts with the core is studied for families of feasible coalitions satisfying certain structural properties (closedness with respect to intersection, union, addition of a player). In the almost positive games where the cooperational structure satisfies all the restrictions considered, it is shown that both solution concepts coincide with the core.
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 969999 (Why is no real title available?)
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