Constrained core solutions for totally positive games with ordered players

DOI10.1007/s00182-013-0382-xzbMath1292.91026OpenAlexW2153470336MaRDI QIDQ2453492

Gerard van der Laan, René van den Brink, Valeri A. Vasil'ev

Publication date: 6 June 2014

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0382-x

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuecoreTU gamesaxiomatic characterizationsolution conceptsselectopeHarsanyi dividendspolluted river gamestotally positive TU game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (9)

A new basis and the Shapley value ⋮ The priority value for cooperative games with a priority structure ⋮ On Harsanyi Dividends and Asymmetric Values ⋮ Polluted river problems and games with a permission structure ⋮ Nonadditive integration and some solutions of cooperative games ⋮ Axiomatic characterizations of the family of Weighted priority values ⋮ Parallel axiomatizations of weighted and multiweighted Shapley values, random order values, and the Harsanyi set ⋮ Allocating the costs of cleaning a river: expected responsibility versus median responsibility ⋮ Value dividends, the Harsanyi set and extensions, and the proportional Harsanyi solution

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