Constrained core solutions for totally positive games with ordered players

DOI10.1007/S00182-013-0382-XMaRDI QIDQ2453492zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gerard van der Laan, René van den Brink, Valeriĭ Aleksandrovich Vasil'ev

Publication date 6 June 2014

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0382-x

zbMATH Keywords

axiomatic characterizationcoreHarsanyi dividendspolluted river gamesselectopeShapley valuesolution conceptstotally positive TU gameTU games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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Cited in

(12)

• Polluted river problems and games with a permission structure
• Allocating the costs of cleaning a river: expected responsibility versus median responsibility
• Value dividends, the Harsanyi set and extensions, and the proportional Harsanyi solution
• The priority value for cooperative games with a priority structure
• Nonadditive integration and some solutions of cooperative games
• Parallel axiomatizations of weighted and multiweighted Shapley values, random order values, and the Harsanyi set
• Sequentially compatible payoffs and the core in TU-games
• A new basis and the Shapley value
• On Harsanyi dividends and asymmetric values
• Axiomatic characterizations of the family of Weighted priority values
• Priority coalitional games and claims problems
• Mutually dependent, balanced contributions, and the priority value

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