Hierarchical organization structures and constraints on coalition formation

DOI10.1007/BF01240039zbMath0831.90139OpenAlexW2024907804WikidataQ59868873 ScholiaQ59868873MaRDI QIDQ1897341

Jean J. M. Derks, Robert P. Gilles

Publication date: 27 August 1995

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01240039

zbMATH Keywords

transferable utilitiesconstraints in coalition formationhierarchical organization structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Hierarchical systems (93A13)

Related Items (27)

Characterizations of solutions for games with precedence constraints ⋮ Remarkable polyhedra related to set functions, games and capacities ⋮ Networks, Communication and Hierarchy: Applications to Cooperative Games ⋮ On a class of vertices of the core ⋮ Accessibility in oriented networks ⋮ An axiomatization of the core of games with restricted cooperation ⋮ Accessibility measures to nodes of directed graphs using solutions for generalized cooperative games ⋮ Games on concept lattices: Shapley value and core ⋮ The bounded core for games with precedence constraints ⋮ Characterization of the core in games with restricted cooperation ⋮ A system-theoretic model for cooperation, interaction and allocation ⋮ Solution concepts for games with general coalitional structure ⋮ The core and the Weber set for bicooperative games ⋮ The cone of supermodular games on finite distributive lattices ⋮ The core of games on ordered structures and graphs ⋮ Games with a permission structure -- a survey on generalizations and applications ⋮ The restricted core of games on distributive lattices: how to share benefits in a hierarchy ⋮ On the restricted cores and the bounded core of games on distributive lattices ⋮ Monge extensions of cooperation and communication structures ⋮ Cooperative games with partial information ⋮ Directed networks, allocation properties and hierarchy formation ⋮ Cooperative games with restricted formation of coalitions ⋮ Algorithms for computing the Shapley value of cooperative games on lattices ⋮ A Hierarchical Model for Cooperative Games ⋮ Consistent restricted Shapley values ⋮ Cooperative games on antimatroids ⋮ Simple games on closure spaces

Cites Work

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• Barriers to trade and disadvantageous middlemen: nonmonotonicity of the core
• A value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation
• Super-modularity: Applications to convex games and to the greedy algorithm for LP
• Games with permission structures: The conjunctive approach
• A short proof of the inclusion of the core in the Weber set
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• A Shapley value for games with restricted coalitions
• Cores of convex games
• Values of Graph-Restricted Games
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• Cores of games with restricted cooperation

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