Hierarchical organization structures and constraints on coalition formation

DOI10.1007/BF01240039zbMATH Open0831.90139OpenAlexW2024907804WikidataQ59868873 ScholiaQ59868873MaRDI QIDQ1897341FDOQ1897341

Authors: Jean Derks, Robert P. Gilles 

Publication date: 27 August 1995

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01240039

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zbMATH Keywords

transferable utilitiesconstraints in coalition formationhierarchical organization structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Hierarchical systems (93A13)

Cites Work

• Cores of convex games
• Super-modularity: Applications to convex games and to the greedy algorithm for LP
• Games with permission structures: The conjunctive approach
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• Cores of games with restricted cooperation
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A Shapley value for games with restricted coalitions
• Values of Graph-Restricted Games
• A value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation
• A short proof of the inclusion of the core in the Weber set
• Barriers to trade and disadvantageous middlemen: nonmonotonicity of the core
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (30)

• A system-theoretic model for cooperation, interaction and allocation
• The restricted core of games on distributive lattices: how to share benefits in a hierarchy
• Characterizations of solutions for games with precedence constraints
• The core and the Weber set for bicooperative games
• Cooperative games with partial information
• The core of games on ordered structures and graphs
• The cone of supermodular games on finite distributive lattices
• Directed networks, allocation properties and hierarchy formation
• Accessibility in oriented networks
• Remarkable polyhedra related to set functions, games and capacities
• Cooperative games with restricted formation of coalitions
• The bounded core for games with precedence constraints
• Cooperative games on antimatroids
• An axiomatization of the core of games with restricted cooperation
• Consistent restricted Shapley values
• Monge extensions of cooperation and communication structures
• On a class of vertices of the core
• On the restricted cores and the bounded core of games on distributive lattices
• Games on concept lattices: Shapley value and core
• Characterization of the core in games with restricted cooperation
• Accessibility measures to nodes of directed graphs using solutions for generalized cooperative games
• A Hierarchical Model for Cooperative Games
• HIERARCHICAL ORGANIZATION AND PERFORMANCE INEQUALITY: EVIDENCE FROM PROFESSIONAL CYCLING
• The selectope for cooperative games
• A partition-graph restricted cooperative game with incomplete information
• Algorithms for computing the Shapley value of cooperative games on lattices
• Solution concepts for games with general coalitional structure
• Networks, communication and hierarchy: applications to cooperative games
• Games with a permission structure -- a survey on generalizations and applications
• Simple games on closure spaces

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