On the Harsanyi payoff vectors and Harsanyi imputations

DOI10.1007/s11238-008-9124-0zbMath1202.91012WikidataQ59868829 ScholiaQ59868829MaRDI QIDQ2270215

Gerard van der Laan, Jean J. M. Derks, Valeri A. Vasil'ev

Publication date: 15 March 2010

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-008-9124-0

zbMATH Keywords

core; convex games; TU-games; Harsanyi set; external stability; imputations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91A06: (n)-person games, (n>2)

Related Items

On Harsanyi Dividends and Asymmetric Values, The core of games on ordered structures and graphs, The probabilistic Harsanyi power solutions for probabilistic graph games, Extreme points of the Harsanyi set and the Weber set, Harsanyi power solution for games with restricted cooperation, Fuzzy Harsanyi solution for a kind of fuzzy coalition games, Harsanyi power solutions for games on union stable systems

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