On the Harsanyi payoff vectors and Harsanyi imputations

DOI10.1007/s11238-008-9124-0zbMath1202.91012OpenAlexW2085481325WikidataQ59868829 ScholiaQ59868829MaRDI QIDQ2270215

Gerard van der Laan, Jean J. M. Derks, Valeri A. Vasil'ev

Publication date: 15 March 2010

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-008-9124-0

zbMATH Keywords

coreconvex gamesTU-gamesHarsanyi setexternal stabilityimputations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Related Items (7)

On Harsanyi Dividends and Asymmetric Values ⋮ Harsanyi power solution for games with restricted cooperation ⋮ The probabilistic Harsanyi power solutions for probabilistic graph games ⋮ Extreme points of the Harsanyi set and the Weber set ⋮ The core of games on ordered structures and graphs ⋮ Fuzzy Harsanyi solution for a kind of fuzzy coalition games ⋮ Harsanyi power solutions for games on union stable systems

Cites Work

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• The Harsanyi set for cooperative TU-game
• The selectope for cooperative games
• Cores of convex games
• A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game

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