On the Efficiency of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism for Divisible Resources

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_13zbMath1358.91070arXiv1507.07011OpenAlexW2513685331MaRDI QIDQ3449590

Alkmini Sgouritsa, George Christodoulou, Bo Tang

Publication date: 4 November 2015

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1507.07011

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (4)

Unnamed Item ⋮ Social and Private Interests Coordination Engines in Resource Allocation: System Compatibility, Corruption, and Regional Development ⋮ On the efficiency of the proportional allocation mechanism for divisible resources ⋮ Evolutionary methods for solving dynamic resource allocation problems

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• Efficiency of Scalar-Parameterized Mechanisms
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• Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient
• Composable and efficient mechanisms
• Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game
• Automata, Languages and Programming
• Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions
• Subadditive functions

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