Social and Private Interests Coordination Engines in Resource Allocation: System Compatibility, Corruption, and Regional Development

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-39789-0_4zbMath1448.91135OpenAlexW3034340227MaRDI QIDQ5118427

Olga Gorbaneva, Guennady A. Ougolnitsky

Publication date: 8 September 2020

Published in: Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39789-0_4

zbMATH Keywords

social welfare functionsprice of anarchySPICE-modelsadministrative and economical mechanismsdescriptive and normative approachessocial and private interestssystem consistensy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

• Private provision of a public good with time-allocation choice
• Phenomena in inverse Stackelberg games. II: Dynamic problems
• Phenomena in inverse Stackelberg games. I: Static problems
• A condition for the existence of a Nash equilibrium in games with public and private objectives
• On the Efficiency of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism for Divisible Resources
• When Are Nash Equilibria Independent of the Distribution of Agents' Characteristics?
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