Social and private interests coordination engines in resource allocation: system compatibility, corruption, and regional development
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-39789-0_4zbMATH Open1448.91135OpenAlexW3034340227MaRDI QIDQ5118427FDOQ5118427
Authors: Olga I. Gorbaneva, Gennadiĭ A. Ugol'nitskiĭ 
Publication date: 8 September 2020
Published in: Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39789-0_4
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price of anarchysocial welfare functionsSPICE-modelsadministrative and economical mechanismsdescriptive and normative approachessocial and private interestssystem consistensy
Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)
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- Games with differently directed interests and their application to the environmental management
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Cited In (8)
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- Bilevel models for investment policy in resource-rich regions
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- Mechanisms of struggle with corruption in dynamic social and private interests coordination engine models
- Simulation modeling of the resource allocation under economic corruption
- Models of concordance of public and private interests in control systems
- Dynamic models of competition and cooperation in Cournot oligopoly taking into account the environmental impact
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