Social and private interests coordination engines in resource allocation: system compatibility, corruption, and regional development

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-39789-0_4MaRDI QIDQ5118427zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Olga I. Gorbaneva, Gennadiĭ A. Ugol'nitskiĭ

Publication date 8 September 2020

Published in Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39789-0_4

zbMATH Keywords

price of anarchysocial welfare functionsSPICE-modelsadministrative and economical mechanismsdescriptive and normative approachessocial and private interestssystem consistensy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3771376 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Games with differently directed interests and their application to the environmental management
• On the Efficiency of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism for Divisible Resources
• Phenomena in inverse Stackelberg games. I: Static problems
• Phenomena in inverse Stackelberg games. II: Dynamic problems
• Private provision of a public good with time-allocation choice
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(8)

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• Dynamic models of competition and cooperation in Cournot oligopoly taking into account the environmental impact
• Bilevel models for investment policy in resource-rich regions
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• Models of concordance of public and private interests in control systems
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