Budget constraints in homogenous multi-unit auctions
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Publication:1936577
DOI10.1007/s11424-012-9301-7zbMath1264.91067MaRDI QIDQ1936577
Yong Zhao, Yaqiong Wu, Chaoyuan Yue, Xianglin Wu
Publication date: 6 February 2013
Published in: Journal of Systems Science and Complexity (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11424-012-9301-7
93B51: Design techniques (robust design, computer-aided design, etc.)
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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Cites Work
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