Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer
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Publication:2212767
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.014zbMath1452.91157OpenAlexW3084671141MaRDI QIDQ2212767
Juan Carlos Carbajal, Ahuva Mu'alem
Publication date: 24 November 2020
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.014
incentive compatibilityrevenue equivalenceprivate budgetsallocation networksincremental valuesmulti-item allocation problems
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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