Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:893399)
Recommendations
- Monotonicity and implementability
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1014877
- Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences
- Monotonicity, implementation and generalized strategy-proofness
- On monotonic differential schemes
- A monotonicity calculus and its completeness
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4013927
- On algorithms for difference of monotone operators
- On Algorithms for Difference of Monotone Operators
- Publication:3197545
Cites work
- A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
- Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
- Convex Analysis
- Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees.
- Extremal incentive compatible transfers
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
- Mechanism design. A linear programming approach.
- Monotonicity and implementability
- Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces
- Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Optimal Auction Design
- Strategy proofness and Pareto efficiency in quasilinear exchange economies
- Strategy-Proof Exchange
- Strategy-proof social choice with continuous separable preferences
- Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
- Truthful germs are contagious: a local-to-global characterization of truthfulness
- Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
- Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
Cited in
(11)- The polyhedral geometry of truthful auctions
- Local incentive compatibility with transfers
- Implementing randomized allocation rules with outcome-contingent transfers
- Monotonicity and implementability
- On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms
- Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer
- Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
- Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments
- Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences
- Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles
- Monotonicity in mechanism design (abstract)
This page was built for publication: Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q893399)
