Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences
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Publication:893399
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.09.001zbMATH Open1369.91051OpenAlexW1651216127MaRDI QIDQ893399FDOQ893399
Rudolf Müller, Juan Carlos Carbajal
Publication date: 19 November 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.09.001
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2-cycle monotonicityrevenue equivalencecyclic monotonicitymonotonic transformations in differencestruthful implementability
Cites Work
- Convex Analysis
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- Optimal Auction Design
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- Strategy-Proof Exchange
- A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
- Strategy-proof social choice with continuous separable preferences
- Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
- Truthful germs are contagious: a local-to-global characterization of truthfulness
- Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
- Monotonicity and Implementability
- Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
- Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces
- Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees.
- Strategy proofness and Pareto efficiency in quasilinear exchange economies
Cited In (9)
- The polyhedral geometry of truthful auctions
- Local incentive compatibility with transfers
- Implementing randomized allocation rules with outcome-contingent transfers
- On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms
- Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer
- Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments
- Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences
- Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles
- Monotonicity in mechanism design (abstract)
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