Implementing randomized allocation rules with outcome-contingent transfers

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105878MaRDI QIDQ6604767zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Yi Liu, Fan Wu

Publication date 13 September 2024

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

implementationmechanism designtransferdual coneconvex envelope

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Recommendations

• Implementation via mechanisms with transfers
• Extremal incentive compatible transfers
• Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers
• Implementation with contingent contracts
• Approximate random allocation mechanisms

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3670138 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2107836 (Why is no real title available?)
• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• Bayesian persuasion with costly messages
• Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives
• Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences
• Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment
• Monotonicity and implementability
• Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences
• Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
• Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal Transport
• Test Design Under Falsification
• Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
• Weak monotonicity and Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility
• When are local incentive constraints sufficient?
• When is a monotone function cyclically monotone?

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