Implementing randomized allocation rules with outcome-contingent transfers

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105878zbMATH Open1544.91088MaRDI QIDQ6604767FDOQ6604767

Authors: Yi Liu, Fan Wu 

Publication date: 13 September 2024

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Recommendations

• Implementation via mechanisms with transfers
• Extremal incentive compatible transfers
• Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers
• Implementation with contingent contracts
• Approximate random allocation mechanisms

zbMATH Keywords

implementationmechanism designtransferdual coneconvex envelope

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Optimal Transport
• When are local incentive constraints sufficient?
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• Optimal Auction Design
• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• Bayesian persuasion with costly messages
• Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
• Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
• Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
• Weak monotonicity and Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility
• Monotonicity and implementability
• Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences
• Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences
• Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives
• Test Design Under Falsification
• When is a monotone function cyclically monotone?
• Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment

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