Auctions vs. fixed pricing: competing for budget constrained buyers

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.003zbMath1393.91094OpenAlexW2282407049MaRDI QIDQ2357823

Cemil Selcuk

Publication date: 20 June 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/85953/1/Round3_Submitted_GEB.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

budget constraintcompeting auctionsfixed pricing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
• Limits of exact equilibria for capacity constrained sellers with costly search.
• High bids and broke winners

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