Trading mechanism selection with directed search when buyers are risk averse

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.12.012zbMATH Open1242.91125OpenAlexW2036557636MaRDI QIDQ433169FDOQ433169

Authors: Cemil Selcuk 

Publication date: 13 July 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/36224/1/MPRA_paper_36224.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

risk aversiondirected searchcompeting mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60)

Cites Work

• Game theory
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• A Competitive Distribution of Auctions
• Limits of exact equilibria for capacity constrained sellers with costly search.
• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
• Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms
• Equivalence of auctions and posted prices

Cited In (5)

• Bidding for incentive contracts
• Directed search with endogenous capacity
• Auctions vs. fixed pricing: competing for budget constrained buyers
• Robust mechanisms for risk-averse sellers
• Buyer's equilibrium with capacity constraints and restricted mobility: a recursive approach

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