Autocratic Mechanisms: A Form of Dictatorship in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions
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Publication:3459303
DOI10.1142/S0219198915500103zbMath1331.91087MaRDI QIDQ3459303
Publication date: 22 December 2015
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
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