Autocratic Mechanisms: A Form of Dictatorship in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions

DOI10.1142/S0219198915500103zbMath1331.91087MaRDI QIDQ3459303

Rica Gonen, Anat Lerner

Publication date: 22 December 2015

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto optimalitydictatorshipincentive compatibilitybudget constraints

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Efficient Constrained Combinatorial Auctions

Cites Work

• A note on the incompatibility of strategy-proofness and Pareto-optimality in quasi-linear settings with public budgets
• Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
• Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
• The incompatibility of Pareto optimality and dominant-strategy incentive compatibility in sufficiently-anonymous budget-constrained quasilinear settings
• Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders
• Dictatorial Mechanisms in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions
• Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
• Incentives in Teams
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains

This page was built for publication: Autocratic Mechanisms: A Form of Dictatorship in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions