A note on the incompatibility of strategy-proofness and Pareto-optimality in quasi-linear settings with public budgets

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.11.043zbMATH Open1242.91086OpenAlexW2004168648MaRDI QIDQ433728FDOQ433728

Ron Lavi, Marina May

Publication date: 6 July 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.11.043

Recommendations

• The incompatibility of Pareto optimality and dominant-strategy incentive compatibility in sufficiently-anonymous budget-constrained quasilinear settings
• Characterizing incentive compatible, Pareto optimal and sufficiently anonymous constrained combinatorial mechanisms -- two players case
• Characterizing the incentive compatible and Pareto optimal efficiency space for two players, \(k\) items, public budget and quasilinear utilities
• Efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains
• Pareto optimal budgeted combinatorial auctions

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto-optimalitystrategy-proofnessbudget constraints

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Incentives in Teams
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
• Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (12)

• The incompatibility of Pareto optimality and dominant-strategy incentive compatibility in sufficiently-anonymous budget-constrained quasilinear settings
• A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights
• A note on the impossibility of multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders
• Designing efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms is almost impossible in quasi-linear environments
• Dictatorial mechanisms in constrained combinatorial auctions
• Autocratic Mechanisms: A Form of Dictatorship in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions
• Mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with budget constraints
• Towards characterizing the deterministic combinatorial constrained efficient space
• Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity
• Characterizing incentive compatible, Pareto optimal and sufficiently anonymous constrained combinatorial mechanisms – Two players case
• Characterizing the incentive compatible and Pareto optimal efficiency space for two players, \(k\) items, public budget and quasilinear utilities
• A multi-item auction with budget-constrained bidders and price controls

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