Strategy-proof budgeting via a VCG-like mechanism

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-43254-5_23MaRDI QIDQ6546309zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Jonathan Wagner, Reshef Meir

Publication date 29 May 2024

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-43254-5_23

zbMATH Keywords

participatory budgetingVCG

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

• The participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism
• A note on the incompatibility of strategy-proofness and Pareto-optimality in quasi-linear settings with public budgets
• Strategy-proof compromises
• Truthful aggregation of budget proposals
• Sequential pivotal mechanisms for public project problems

Cites work

• A parametric analysis of prospect theory's functionals for the general population
• Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation of uncertainty
• Algorithmic Game Theory
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Dominant strategy implementation in a large population public goods game
• Funding public projects: a case for the Nash product rule
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5485471 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3670138 (Why is no real title available?)
• Iterative local voting for collective decision-making in continuous spaces
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Market equilibrium under separable, piecewise-linear, concave utilities
• Participatory funding coordination: model, axioms and rules
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The core of the participatory budgeting problem
• The structure of strategy-proof social choice. I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces
• Truthful aggregation of budget proposals
• Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions

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