Strategy-proof compromises

DOI10.2202/1935-1704.1684MaRDI QIDQ2867440zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Peter Postl

Publication date 19 December 2013

Published in The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://opus.bath.ac.uk/31975/1/Postl_BEJTE_2011.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

compromisedictatorshipdominant strategy implementationpublic good provisionstrategy-proof decision rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Public goods (91B18)

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(9)

• There are more strategy-proof procedures than you think
• A note on Matsushima's regularity condition
• Binary public decisions and undominated mechanisms
• Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
• Strategy-proof location of a public bad on a disc
• Equilibrium and effectiveness of two-parameter scoring rules
• PADUA Protocol: Strategies and Tactics
• Strategy-proof budgeting via a VCG-like mechanism
• Efficient compromising

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