Dictatorial Mechanisms in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions
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Publication:2867515
DOI10.1515/bejte-2013-0006zbMath1277.91065OpenAlexW2023310739MaRDI QIDQ2867515
Publication date: 19 December 2013
Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2013-0006
Related Items (4)
Autocratic Mechanisms: A Form of Dictatorship in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions ⋮ Towards characterizing the deterministic combinatorial constrained efficient space ⋮ Characterizing the incentive compatible and Pareto optimal efficiency space for two players, \(k\) items, public budget and quasilinear utilities ⋮ The incompatibility of Pareto optimality and dominant-strategy incentive compatibility in sufficiently-anonymous budget-constrained quasilinear settings
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