Dictatorial Mechanisms in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions

DOI10.1515/bejte-2013-0006zbMath1277.91065OpenAlexW2023310739MaRDI QIDQ2867515

Rica Gonen, Anat Lerner

Publication date: 19 December 2013

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2013-0006

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

Autocratic Mechanisms: A Form of Dictatorship in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions ⋮ Towards characterizing the deterministic combinatorial constrained efficient space ⋮ Characterizing the incentive compatible and Pareto optimal efficiency space for two players, \(k\) items, public budget and quasilinear utilities ⋮ The incompatibility of Pareto optimality and dominant-strategy incentive compatibility in sufficiently-anonymous budget-constrained quasilinear settings

Cites Work

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• Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness
• Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
• Incentives in Teams
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result

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