Overbidding and inefficiencies in multi-unit Vickrey auctions for normal goods
From MaRDI portal
Publication:324135
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.07.002zbMath1394.91152OpenAlexW2499100997MaRDI QIDQ324135
Publication date: 10 October 2016
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.07.002
Related Items (3)
Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: characterization of minimum price rule ⋮ Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects ⋮ On the consensus effect
Cites Work
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
- A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints
- Vickrey allocation rule with income effect
- Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations
- Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
- Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical
- The Relevance of a Choice of Auction Format in a Competitive Environment
- Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
- Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
- Asymptotic Efficiency for Discriminatory Private Value Auctions
- Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions
- Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: A characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule
- Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions
- Auction design without quasilinear preferences
This page was built for publication: Overbidding and inefficiencies in multi-unit Vickrey auctions for normal goods
