Approximately Efficient Double Auctions with Strong Budget Balance

DOI10.1137/1.9781611974331.ch98zbMath1417.91232OpenAlexW4236466238MaRDI QIDQ4575681

Bart de Keijzer, Stefano Turchetta, Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Stefano Leonardi

Publication date: 16 July 2018

Published in: Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611974331.ch98

zbMATH Keywords

double auctionsincentive compatible mechanismindividually rational mechanismstrongly budget-balanced mechanismunit-demand buyersunit-supply sellers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (9)

Polyhedral Clinching Auctions for Two-Sided Markets ⋮ (Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading ⋮ Cost sharing in two-sided markets ⋮ Ascending-price mechanism for general multi-sided markets ⋮ Dynamic Double Auctions: Toward First Best ⋮ Approximating Gains-from-Trade in Bilateral Trading ⋮ Strongly budget balanced auctions for multi-sided markets ⋮ SBBA: A Strongly-Budget-Balanced Double-Auction Mechanism ⋮ Revenue Maximization for Market Intermediation with Correlated Priors

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