Cost sharing in two-sided markets

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-85947-3_17MaRDI QIDQ2670930zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sreenivas Gollapudi, Kostas Kollias, Ali Shameli

Publication date 1 June 2022

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.02718

zbMATH Keywords

cost sharingmechanism designtwo-sided markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Abstract: Motivated by the emergence of popular service-based two-sided markets where sellers can serve multiple buyers at the same time, we formulate and study the {em two-sided cost sharing} problem. In two-sided cost sharing, sellers incur different costs for serving different subsets of buyers and buyers have different values for being served by different sellers. Both buyers and sellers are self-interested agents whose values and costs are private information. We study the problem from the perspective of an intermediary platform that matches buyers to sellers and assigns prices and wages in an effort to maximize welfare (i.e., buyer values minus seller costs) subject to budget-balance in an incentive compatible manner. In our markets of interest, agents trade the (often same) services multiple times. Moreover, the value and cost for the same service differs based on the context (e.g., location, urgency, weather conditions, etc). In this framework, we design mechanisms that are efficient, ex-ante budget-balanced, ex-ante individually rational, dominant strategy incentive compatible, and ex-ante in the core (a natural generalization of the core that we define here).

Recommendations

• New trade-offs in cost-sharing mechanisms
• Dynamic double auctions: toward first best
• Dynamic double auctions: towards first best
• Simple and near-optimal mechanisms for market intermediation
• Approximately Efficient Double Auctions with Strong Budget Balance

Cites work

• (Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• A dominant strategy double auction
• An efficient cost-sharing mechanism for the prize-collecting Steiner forest problem
• Approximately Efficient Double Auctions with Strong Budget Balance
• Approximating gains-from-trade in bilateral trading
• Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders
• Beyond Moulin mechanisms
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Fixed price approximability of the optimal gain from trade
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139280 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1929535 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incentives in Teams
• Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness
• Is Shapley cost sharing optimal?
• Modularity and greed in double auctions
• Quantifying inefficiency in cost-sharing mechanisms
• Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency
• The cooperative game theory foundations of network bargaining games
• The Core of an N Person Game
• Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming

Cited in

(8)

• On the theory of cost sharing
• A discrete cost sharing model with technological cooperation
• Market sharing dynamics between two service providers
• Responsibility and cross-subsidization in cost sharing
• On demand responsiveness in additive cost sharing
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5685000 (Why is no real title available?)
• A flexible cost share approach to markup estimation
• Platform exploitation in the sharing economy

This page was built for publication: Cost sharing in two-sided markets

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2670930)